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INTRODUCTION
Among the many executive actions to reform immigration enforcement taken
by President Obama on November 20, 2014, one measure was not like the
others.1 Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson directed Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to discontinue the Secure Communities program,
under which noncitizens arrested by local law enforcement could be detained
and eventually transferred to federal custody to process their deportations.2 This
action differed substantively from the other forms of prosecutorial discretion
utilized by the Obama Administration because it benefits immigrants who have
a criminal record. This conflicts with the general Obama strategy on immigra-
tion enforcement, which prioritizes noncitizens with criminal records for appre-
hension and deportation.3 In the President's words: "Felons, not families.
Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mom who's working hard to
provide for her kids."4
Given the President's expressed "felons, not families" policy, it is peculiar
that ICE would be asked to shut down a program that specifically targets
noncitizens who are arrested on suspicion of criminal activity. Although the
Obama Administration has used its discretion to grant reprieves from deporta-
tion for millions of unauthorized immigrants, it has also deported noncitizens at
a record rate.5 This dual approach depends in large part on ICE's ability to find
immigrants with criminal records so that the government may target its apprehen-
sion, detention, and deportation resources accordingly. Secure Communities
was a critical tool in carrying out this policy because it made it easy for ICE to
make sure that immigrants arrested by local authorities would not be released
back into the community.6 But the critical link in Secure Communities was the
use of ICE detainers, through which ICE asked local police to detain people
longer than they would be permitted to on purely criminal grounds so that ICE
agents could easily take them into federal custody.
7
1. See generally Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action-Key Facts,
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action (last updated Jan. 5, 2014).
2. JEH JOHNSON, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM: SECURE COMMUNITIES (Nov. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES], available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14
1120 memo secure communities.pdf.
3. See JEH JOHNSON, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM: POLICIES FOR THE APPREHENSION,
DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120 memo prosecutorial discretion.pdf.
4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-
address-nation-immigration.
5. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 6 fig. 2 (Sept. 2014), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ois enforcement ar 2013.pdf.
6. See generally Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.
gov/secure-communities (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
7. See generally ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/detainer-faq (last updated Dec. 28, 2011).
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The end of Secure Communities was a retreat for DHS in the face of
mounting resistance from local governments and the judiciary.8 Most impor-
tantly, in 2014 several federal district courts had found that local police would
be liable for civil rights violations if they heeded ICE detainer requests by
keeping noncitizens in custody when a citizen in the same situation would be
released. 9 In December 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
reported that growing resistance from courts and localities to the detainers had
led to a reduction in overall deportations.1 0 The constitutional problem in these
cases was that ICE does not obtain judicial warrants before it arrests immigrants
for deportation. 1  Nor is there any immediate probable cause finding. 12 In
immigration enforcement, warrantless arrests are the norm, and there is no
automatic, neutral review of probable cause if the arrested person is held in
custody as would be required in a criminal case under the Fourth Amendment. 13
As a result, federal district courts found no legal basis for local police to detain
people, even when an ICE officer believed them to be in the country unlawfully.
But this raises an obvious question: if local police cannot detain noncitizens
because there is no judicial warrant and no probable cause, why can ICE do
exactly the same thing? 14 But if such arrests are vulnerable to constitutional
challenge, then is much of how this country enforces immigration law at risk?
This is precisely the situation we now face.
Unlike other literature on the issue, I am not directly challenging the massive
growth of immigration detention or the policy of mandatory detention that feeds
it.1 5 This policy deserves and has attracted significant critique. 16 But for the
8. SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 1 ("Governors, mayors, and state and local law enforcement
officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have
issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation. A number of federal courts have
rejected the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to detain immigrants pursuant to
federal detainers issued under the current Secure Communities program.").
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014,
at 5 (2014), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.
pdf.
11. SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 1.
12. Id.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. Cf. Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 103), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2501704
("Whether characterized as a matter of law as civil or criminal and no matter if carried out by federal,
state, or local officials, every type of immigration law enforcement shares a common central feature:
imprisonment.").
15. See generally, Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (2013) (describing the dramatic expansion of immigration
detention since the mid-1990s).
16. See, e.g., id.; Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363 (2014); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002); Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010); Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia
Hernandez, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REv. 1346 (2014); Anil Kalhan,
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purposes of this Article, I assume for the sake of argument that Congress
can-if it so chooses-designate a class of people subject to mandatory deten-
tion while they are awaiting resolution of their deportation hearings. 17 But even
conceding this point, there are still unanswered questions. What procedures
should be used to decide whether an individual belongs in this class? Who
should make this decision? What standard of evidence should apply? How long
may a person be detained before this decision is made? In short, whatever
detention policy Congress chooses to set for immigration enforcement, what
procedures are in place to adjudicate whether a person should be subject to it?
The recent cases in which localities have been sued for detaining people on
ICE detainers mark a critical turning point in the constitutional regulation of
immigration enforcement. Previously, successful challenges to immigration
detention had focused on the length of detention and concerned relatively
exceptional cases where the government was unable to execute deportation
orders promptly.18 Thus, they attacked immigration enforcement only on the
back end. Because most immigration detainees are actually detained for a
relatively short period of time, such challenges could only affect a minority of
immigration cases.1 9 The new wave of federal cases are different because they
find constitutional weakness with the way in which immigrants are taken into
custody, not just with how long they are detained. They attack immigration
enforcement on the front end.
To be clear, the cases so far have questioned the authority of state and local
police to detain people based on ICE detainers, not the authority of ICE to
arrest. Nor do they necessarily question the authority of Customs and Border
Protection Officers to make arrests at the border and ports of entry. But these
cases are part of a trend in which successful constitutional challenges have
moved incrementally closer and closer to the front end of immigration enforce-
ment. The principal constitutional problem with immigration enforcement is
that a person may be deprived of liberty without any prompt review by a neutral
magistrate to determine if probable cause exists to justify the arrest and contin-
Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 42 (2010); Mark Noferi, Cascading
Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants
Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012); Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing
Detention: Structural Impunity and the Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REv. 447 (2013);
Whitney Chelgren, Note, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is Unconstitutional to Detain Immi-
grants Without Procedural Protections, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv 1477 (2011); Faiza W. Sayed, Note,
Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than "Enemy Combatants"
and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (2011); Travis Silva, Note, Toward a
Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 227 (2012).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. For examples of relatively exceptional cases, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and its
progeny. See discussion infra Part III.A.
19. In 2012, 70% of ICE detainees were released within thirty days. Only 3% spent more than 180
days detained, which is the situation in which Zadvydas and its progeny apply. See Legal Noncitizens
Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 3, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/321.
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ued custody. This problem is coming into focus at a time when the meaning of
the plenary power doctrine, which has long justified expansive federal authority
over immigration matters, appears to be narrowed so that long standing statutes
and regulations may be becoming more vulnerable to constitutional attack. As
Professor Stephen Legomsky has explained, the doctrine was long understood
to mean that the federal government had vast authority over immigration, or
courts had limited authority to review immigration enforcement. 20 But more
recent cases have found that there are in fact constitutional limits on immigra-
tion law and have shown federal courts increasingly willing to apply them.
2 1
To illustrate why immigration enforcement is growing more vulnerable to
constitutional attack, this Article seeks to retell and update an old but rapidly
evolving story: how the statutory, regulatory, and institutional mechanisms of
immigration enforcement were built in a parallel legal universe in which routine
constitutional rights that shaped other areas of law enforcement were effectively
inapplicable. From the late nineteenth century through the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court generally regarded immigration enforcement as a civil matter
and as a matter of national sovereignty. Over time, the result of this approach
was that the government gained the power to arrest and detain noncitizens on
immigration grounds with little constitutional restraint. But at the dawn of the
twenty-first century, the Supreme Court signaled an end to this era with its
decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, holding that "indefinite detention of
aliens ... would raise serious constitutional concerns" and that the federal
government's power to enforce immigration law "is subject to important consti-
tutional limitations. 2 2
It should be noted at the outset that Zadvydas was a due process case,
concerning noncitizens held for lengthy periods of time after the conclusion of
their deportation cases, which are known in immigration law as "removal
proceedings." It dealt with immigration detention at the back end. The problem
that I raise in this Article concerns the beginning of immigration detention,
including the arrest by ICE and the initial decision to leave a person in custody
while removal proceedings are pending. The deprivation of liberty involved
here would support a strong claim for procedural due process, but the Constitu-
tion normally analyzes these issues through the Fourth Amendment because that
Amendment speaks specifically to the government action of "seizing" a per-
son. 2 3 But the Fourth Amendment and due process overlap because the require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment is, in effect, a requirement for a certain kind of
process. Moreover, in Zadvydas, the Court opened the door to "constitutional
20. Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and
Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1615, 1616-17 (2000).
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 695.
23. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (holding that Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion on unreasonable seizure includes seizure of a person).
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24limitations," not only due process claims.
Recent lower court decisions indicate that the next chapter in this story may
be a frontal attack on immigration custody. I propose a minimally disruptive
means of solving the problem through the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
that the Supreme Court used in Zadvydas. This solution is important both to
preserve the continuity of immigration enforcement, and to allow judges to rule
on a constitutional problem without fear of sparking chaos. It is quite plausible
that the statutory framework by which ICE currently takes people into custody
is unconstitutional, at least as it has been understood and implemented. Thus,
federal authorities could be left without any framework by which to effectively
enforce immigration law were a court to simply strike down the provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizing immigration arrests.
Given the stalemate in Congress over immigration reform, one could reasonably
wonder how long it would take the legislative process to fill the resulting void.
This scenario is not especially desirable from the standpoint of rule of law and
maintenance of public order. The specter of immigration chaos is also likely to
cause hesitation for judges who might otherwise see merit in the constitutional
arguments against the present system. Rather than strike down the INA, I
suggest that the statute can be reinterpreted so as to establish a mechanism of
regular judicial review of immigration arrests and detention.
I begin in Part I by describing the recent litigation over ICE detainers that
highlighted a Fourth Amendment problem with immigration arrests. In Part II, I
trace how immigration enforcement was permitted by the Supreme Court to
develop in a parallel universe, insulated from constitutional attack by the
plenary power doctrine. In Part III, I describe why recent jurisprudence has
exposed this parallel universe to newly potent constitutional challenges. Part IV
compares the apparatus of immigration arrests and detention to the constitu-
tional safeguards that have developed in other areas of law. I conclude with a
proposal for how these constitutional problems may be remedied by reinterpreting the
INA in accordance with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. I propose that the
existing statute should be interpreted to require that imimigration arrests be automati-
cally reviewed by a neutral immigration judge within a seventy-two hour period,
unless the person is released from custody first. I base this proposal on a comparison
with criminal procedure, as well as standards used to govern non-criminal custody
cases, especially involuntary civil commitment.
I. CANARY IN THE COAL MINE: THE TROUBLE WITH ICE DETAINERS
The early warning signal that there may be a constitutional problem with
immigration arrests has come through several district court cases in which the
federal government has not even been a party.2 5 The most influential of these
24. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
25. Professor Christopher Lasch published an article in 2013 that largely anticipated the Fourth
Amendment problems with immigration detainers that led to they rejection by courts in 2014. See
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was from Clackamas County, Oregon, where police arrested Maria Miranda-
Olivares in March 2012 for violating a restraining order.26 The police notified
ICE of her arrest, and the next day ICE issued a detainer requesting that she be
detained for an extra forty-eight hours, excluding the weekend, so that ICE
could take custody of her.27 Meanwhile, the local judge set bail of $5,000 for
her criminal case, which meant that she needed to pay only $500 to leave jail
while her case was pending.28 But the county jail told Miranda-Olivares and her
family that even if she paid the required bail, she would not be released because
of the ICE detainer.2 9 She thus remained in custody for fifteen days, after which
she pled guilty and was sentenced to forty-eight hours in jail, with credit for
time served.30 She then sued for damages for a civil rights violation for having
been wrongfully detained for the additional time.31
Miranda-Olivares prevailed on her Fourth Amendment claim. 32 The court
found that once she reached the moment after which she could have been
released on bail but for the ICE detainer, she had been unconstitutionally seized
by the county jail, in the terminology of the Fourth Amendment, without a
warrant and without any probable cause.33 The Court said:
In order for the County to hold a person beyond the period necessary to
execute an order of legal authority to continue detention, it must meet the
clearly defined reasonable seizure standards of the Fourth Amendment....
Prolonged detention after a seizure, such as full custodial confinement without
a warrant, must be based on probable cause. Absent probable cause, that
detention was unlawful.34
The premise that a jail cannot hold someone without probable cause was
hardly groundbreaking. But the court's critical finding was that an ICE detainer
does not constitute probable cause:
Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 629, 696-698 (2013).
26. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1 (D. Or.
Apr. 11, 2014). In the Secretary of Homeland Security's memorandum ending Secure Communities, the
Clackamas County case was the first one cited in acknowledging "the increasing number of federal
court decisions that hold that detainer-based detention by state and local law enforcement agencies
violates the Fourth Amendment." SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 2.
27. Miranda- Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2.
28. Id.
29. ld.
30. Id. at *3.
31. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (permitting damages for violation of constitutional rights of any
person in the United States).
32. Miranda- Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at "1.
33. In Fourth Amendment law, a person is "seized" when a government official makes him or her
reasonably believe that s/he is not at liberty to leave or go about his or her business. See Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
34. Miranda- Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at * 11 (internal citations omitted).
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The County admits that Miranda-Olivares was held past the time she could
have posted bail and after her state charges were resolved based exclusively
on the ICE detainer. But the ICE detainer alone did not demonstrate probable
cause to hold Miranda-Olivares. It stated only that an investigation "has been
initiated" to determine whether she was subject to removal from the United
States.
The logic and the facts are difficult to assail. There is no mechanism by
which any judge or neutral adjudicator assesses at the outset of an immigration
case that ICE has solid grounds for concluding that a person is in the United
States unlawfully.36 In fact, in most removal cases there is no neutral determina-
tion about deportability until the conclusion of removal proceedings in immigra-
tion court.
37
Miranda-Olivares's lawsuit was resolved at a critical moment in April 2014,
accelerating a trend in which counties around the country began announcing
that they would no longer detain people on the basis of ICE requests. 38 In fact,
2014 saw a wave of cases successfully challenging ICE detainers on constitu-
tional grounds. The Third Circuit had reached a similar holding in March
2014. 3 9 In February 2014, a federal court in Rhode Island held: "One needs to
look no further than the detainer itself to determine that there was no probable
cause to support its issuance.",40 Several other federal courts reached similar
holdings in unpublished decisions in 2014.41
The DHS noted at the end of 2014 that the growing resistance to honoring
ICE detainers had become a significant operational challenge:
ICE's efforts in the interior, however, were impacted by an increasing number
of state and local jurisdictions that are declining to honor ICE detainers. As a
result, instead of state and local jails transferring criminal aliens in their
custody to ICE for removal, such aliens were released by state and local
authorities. Since January 2014, state and local law enforcement authorities
declined to honor 10,182 detainers. This required ICE to expend additional
35. Id.
36. See discussion infra Part IVA.
37. See, e.g., People v. Xirum, 993 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding that probable
cause exists to detain on the basis of an immigration detainer when an immigration court had
previously issued an order of removal).
38. See Amanda Peterson Beadle, Why 250 Counties Have Stopped Honoring Local ICE Detainers,
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 22, 2014), http://imniigrationimpact.com/2014/09/22/why-250-counties-have-
stopped-honoring-local-ice-detainers; John Couwels, Lawsuit Fears Cause Cops to Turn Down Feds'
Immigration Checks, CNN (Aug. 3, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/01/politics/customs-
immigration-detainers; Julia Preston, Sheriffs Limit Detention of Immigrants, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/us/politics/sheriffs-limit-detention-of-imniigrants.html? r-F.
39. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014).
40. Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.I. 2014).
41. See SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 2 n.1 (summarizing court decisions against Secure
Communities); cf Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding
state law provision precluding bail for immigrants unlawfully present violates substantive due process).
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resources attempting to locate, apprehend, and remove criminal aliens who
were released into the community, rather than transferred directly into cus-
tody. These changes further contributed to decreased ICE removals.4 2
In November 2014, the Obama Administration replaced Secure Communities
with a new program in which ICE will ask local communities for notification
about an individual's pending release, but will not ask that the person be
detained for extra time.43 If ICE wishes to request actual detention of the
person, it must specify a basis for probable cause, such as a previously issued
final removal order.44 The intention, however, seems to be to facilitate ICE
officers taking people into custody at the moment when they are released from
local custody. This new system may prevent local governments from being
responsible for immigration-based detention without probable cause. But it
leaves open the question of why ICE agents are permitted to detain the same
people without a finding of probable cause.
This issue had been lurking in immigration cases for some time before the
cascade of local and judicial decisions forced the end of ICE detainers and the
Secure Communities program in 2014. In 2008, a federal judge in Connecticut
found that immigration arrest warrants are deficient for Fourth Amendment
purposes because they are "issued exclusively by executive officials" with no
neutral review. 45 And yet, the normal means of immigration enforcement in the
United States, especially in the interior of the country, is for ICE to make
warrantless arrests, with no automatic or timely review by a neutral adjudica-
46tor. To get any review of whether she is correctly subject to mandatory
immigration detention, a person must know to ask for a hearing; at that hearing
the detainee, rather than DHS, bears the burden of proving that she is "substan-
tially unlikely" to be subject to lawful detention.47
As these 2014 cases show, this system was vulnerable to a strikingly simple,
two-step constitutional attack. First, in the United States, the government may
not deprive a person of liberty without probable cause or due process of law.
Second, immigration arrests deprive people of liberty without any clear standard
of evidence, and without any automatic or timely review by a neutral decision
maker, and thus fail to provide necessary due process. This line of attack has
now been shown to be valid when targeted against local jails that detain people
42. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 10, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
43. SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 2. For an argument that Congress never authorized a
detainer system beyond a request that local authorities notify DHS of a detainee's pending release, see
Lasch, supra note 25, at 693.
44. ld.; see also People v. Xirum, 993 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (finding that previous
removal orders can be the basis for probable cause).
45. El Badrawi v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 275 (D. Conn. 2008).
46. See discussion infra Part IV.
47. See Sayed, supra note 16, at 1834, 1850-51.
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at the request of the federal government. 48 The next question is whether this
attack will be equally potent when targeted at the federal government itself. If it
succeeds, the primary mechanism by which DHS arrests suspected unauthorized
immigrants will be unconstitutional.
However, immigration enforcement has rarely been a simple matter constitu-
tionally. In order to understand how such a system could have survived into the
twenty-first century, and to understand why it may suddenly be vulnerable to
constitutional attack, we need to retrace the way immigration enforcement was
long allowed to exist in a parallel universe in which it was insulated from
constitutional scrutiny. In particular, in 1960 the Supreme Court refused to
declare that immigration arrests must meet Fourth Amendment requirements in
Abel v. United States, denying in particular that warrants must be issued by a
neutral decision maker.4 9 Even on its own terms, Abel is a weak precedent because
Abel had conceded the validity of the warrant before the trial court, so the Court did
not actually affirm the validity of the warrant on the merits.5 0 Even if it had so held, it
would be unclear today whether it remains good law, though some lower courts
continue to rely on it.51 Abel was decided seven years before Camara v. Municipal
Court, where the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment applies to civil and
administrative searches, not only to criminal investigations.5 2
The treatment of immigration arrest warrants in Abel illustrates the peculiar
ways in which immigration enforcement has long been insulated from constitu-
tional standards applicable in other fields of law enforcement. In dicta, the
Court said that immigration arrest warrants enjoyed "the sanction of time"
because they had never been directly challenged and appeared consistent with
the Court's early immigration law jurisprudence, dating back to The Japanese
Immigrant Case in 1903. 53 But, as detailed in Part III, the Court has grown
more willing to apply constitutional limits to immigration enforcement-
certainly more willing than it was in 1903 or 1960. 54 By retracing the Court's
evolving willingness to apply constitutional protections to immigrants, we can
see why immigration law's longstanding constitutional insulation is now wear-
ing perilously thin. We can also see why attacking immigration enforcement on
constitutional grounds remains a difficult battle. But the attack is coming.
48. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cry., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D.
Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
49. 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960).
50. Id. at 230-32.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Abel in upholding the
arrest and ensuing search on an administrative warrant of an escaped convict).
52. 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
53. Abel, 362 U.S. at 230, 233-34 (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)).
54. Camara itself provides an interesting parallel illustrating how the sanction of time may erode.
Camara overruled a precedent that was only eight years old. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959). In dissent, Justice Clark (joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart) protested that the Court was
discarding not just its own case law, but also "municipal experience, which dates back to Colonial
days." Camara, 387 U.S. at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF A PARALLEL UNIVERSE
A. PLENARY POWER, NOT ENUMERATED POWER
Until the dawn of the twenty-first century, there were few constitutional
restraints on the federal government's power to detain people on suspicion of
being unlawfully present in the country. Congress and the Executive Branch
were thus left relatively free to set up an administrative system for adjudicating
deportation cases and detention of potential deportees without needing to worry
much about the system surviving constitutional attack. The Supreme Court's
longstanding unwillingness to apply meaningful constitutional scrutiny to immi-
gration enforcement shaped the enforcement mechanisms that developed. These
mechanisms are built on a particular jurisprudential foundation, a foundation
that is now far less stable.
In the Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889, the Supreme Court was forced to
identify the source of federal authority to regulate immigration. 5 This was not a
simple problem because immigration control is not explicitly one of Congress's
enumerated powers. A strict textual reading of Article I could thus lead to the
conclusion that the power to regulate entry of foreigners actually belongs to
each of the fifty states. Recently, Justice Scalia appeared to endorse a version of
this view in Arizona v. United States, where the Court struck down several
provisions of Arizona's anti-immigrant SB 1070 statute on federalism grounds:
Today's opinion ... deprives States of what most would consider the defining
characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign's
territory people who have no right to be there.
There is no doubt that "before the adoption of the constitution of the United
States" each State had the authority to "prevent [itself] from being burdened
by an influx of persons." And the Constitution did not strip the States of that
authority.
One would conclude from the foregoing that after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion there was some doubt about the power of the Federal Government to control
immigration, but no doubt about the power of the States to do so.
5 6
Although the Constitution makes no explicit reference to a federal power to
regulate the entry of foreigners, Article I does give Congress the authority "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations" and "[t]o establish a uniform rule of
naturalization. 5 7 Assuming that the federal government is one of enumerated
powers, the most straightforward theory of federal authority over immigration
55. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
56. Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2511-13 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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would be to say that international migration is a form of international com-
merce. One of the difficulties with this may have been that the Chinese
Exclusion Case arose at a time when the Court's doctrine on interstate com-
merce was extremely formalistic. In 1888, the Court had held that manufactur-
ing alcohol within a state, even with the intent to sell it across state lines, did
not implicate interstate commerce.5 8 The goods did not become part of inter-
state commerce "until they are committed to the common carrier for transporta-
tion" across state lines. 59 Nevertheless, there would have been a good argument
that international migration satisfies even this restrictive approach because it
necessarily involves transportation, moving across borders, and is closely con-
nected with labor, employment and other economic interests. Moreover, enter-
ing the country and remaining here are steps toward becoming a United States
citizen, and thus may be considered within the federal government's naturaliza-
60tion power.
Basing federal immigration power on the foreign commerce and naturaliza-
tion clauses would have given immigration law a foundation in the text of the
Constitution. It would be consistent with the rule that the federal government
"possesses only certain enumerated powers. But this is not the approach that
the Supreme Court chose. Instead, the Court reasoned that the authority to
regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty and the national "right
of self-preservation," rather than stemming from any specific constitutional
provision.62 In subsequent cases, the Court expanded on this inherent sovereign
power, developing the plenary power doctrine. 3
The Chinese Exclusion Case simply held that Congress has authority to set
immigration policy. But it immediately ushered in an era of nearly unlimited
authority.64 To some extent, this was unsurprising. In the case, a Chinese man
was denied reentry to the United States even though he possessed a written
guarantee of reentry.65 The Court could have held that the federal government
has the authority to set immigration policy but nevertheless found that the facts
of this case raised due process problems. By excluding the man despite his
58. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (the
Commerce power extends to regulation of home-grown cannabis).
59. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 25.
60. The central statutory requirements to naturalize as a United States citizen in most cases are to
enter the United States and legally reside here for a specified number of years. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
As a result, it is difficult to separate the law regulating naturalization from the law regulating entry and
residency of noncitizens.
61. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,205 (1824).
62. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-06, 608
(1889).
63. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressio-
nal Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255 (1984).
64. See Plenary Power DOMA, and Executive Deference, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1583, 1585 (2013)
(summarizing the Court's early immigration cases, which "suggested that immigration decisions made
by Congress and the executive branch were immune from judicial review").
65. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
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reliance on a government promise, the Court appeared to conceive of immi-
grants at the border as having no enforceable rights. Having established federal
authority over immigration, the Court moved quickly to nearly completely
remove the judiciary from playing a role in reviewing how the government
controlled immigration. In Ekiu v. United States, three years after the Chinese
Exclusion Case, the Court refused to intervene in favor of a Japanese woman
detained at the port of San Francisco, holding:
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have
never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the
United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall
be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures
66of the legislative and executive branches of the national government.
As Professor Legomsky wrote, plenary power rendered immigration law "a
constitutional oddity.",67 In 1909, the Court said of immigration that "over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete., 68 Yet
the Court saw no need to find a specific source for the power in the Constitu-
tion. The Court permitted Congress to enact statutes free from the substantive
constitutional restraints that attach to nearly any other subject matter.6 9
B. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
Whereas Ekiu concerned detention at the border, the next year the Court dealt
with a noncitizen who was a long-term resident of the United States. In Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, a federal marshal arrested a Chinese man who had
been living in New York City for more than a decade "without any writ or
warrant," because he had failed to produce a certificate granting him the right to
reside in the country.7 0 He and others in the same situation were granted no trial
or hearing before a judge ordered them deported.71 Again the Court swore off
any judicial role in reviewing the manner in which Congress and the Executive
regulated immigration. 2 But in Fong Yue Ting, the Court offered an additional
rationale for why the constitutional protections that might also otherwise apply
to deprivations of liberty did not apply to immigration enforcement:
66. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
67. Legomsky, supra note 63, at 255.
68. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
69. Legomsky, supra note 63, at 255, 258-59.
70. 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893).
71. Id. at 703,730.
72. Id. at 731 ("The question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to
remain within the United States being one to be determined by the political departments of the
government, the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy,
or the justice of the measures enacted by congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the
constitution over this subject.").
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The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime .... It is but a method
of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied
with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the
nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through the proper
departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.
He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of
trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and
unusual punishments, have no application. 3
This distinction between criminal law and the civil/administrative nature of
immigration enforcement has long been a primary shield against arguments that
immigration adjudication deserves more procedural due process. But it also led
to the earliest indications that some judges were bothered by the implications of
unfettered government power to arrest, detain, and deport. In Fong Yue Ting,
Justice Brewer offered a lone dissent arguing that detaining and deporting a
person lawfully residing inside the country called for constitutional protections
that might not apply to a newcomer stopped at the border.7 4 Despite having
joined the Court's opinions in the Chinese Exclusion Case and Ekiu, Justice
Brewer now warned: "This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one
both indefinite and dangerous. 7 5 And he argued that the proposition that
deportation is not punishment defies common sense about the human impact of
such state action.7 6
Nevertheless, at the outset of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had
established the essential pillars of the parallel universe. The Chinese Exclusion
Case established broad federal authority over immigration. Ekiu established that
a foreigner stopped at the border and refused entry had essentially no rights to
procedural due process. Fong Yue Ting established that even foreigners who had
been longtime residents of the United States could be detained and deported
with little due process, owing to the civil-criminal distinction.
73. ld. at 730.
74. Id. at 733-34, 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (contrasting the Chinese Exclusion Case and Ekiu
with, "[w]hatever may be true as to exclusion... I deny that there is any arbitrary and unrestrained
power to banish residents, even resident aliens").
75. Id. at 737. Justice Brewer worried that the federal government's new immigration authority had
no constitutional limits. He also noted the anti-Asian racial prejudice that gave rise to these cases:
The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism.... [A]mong the
powers reserved to the people, and not delegated to the government, is that of determining
whether whole classes in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be
driven from our territory.
Id. at 737-38.
76. Id. at 740 ("[]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is
punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and
business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes
most severe and cruel.").
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C. THE NORMALIZATION OF UNRESTRAINED IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
For most of the twentieth century, plenary power came to mean that nonciti-
zens could not typically vindicate constitutional claims in immigration cases.77
The apex of such unlimited plenary power was the Court's statement in 1950
that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned., 78 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, the Court cited this broad proposition to affirm indefinite detention,
without a hearing, of a noncitizen at Ellis Island in a case in which the would-be
immigrant was inadmissible to the United States but where no other country
would agree to take him.
7 9
Nevertheless, the Court never completely removed itself from immigration
field, even if it consistently upheld whatever the political branches chose to do.
Although the Court saw no apparent substantive constitutional restraints on the
government's immigration authority, it was at least somewhat more sympathetic
to noncitizens' procedural due process rights.80 Even in Ekiu, the Court recog-
nized that immigrants detained at the border had the right to file a habeas corpus
petition.8 1
In some ways, Mezei provided early hints of a shift on the Court. The
majority embraced Justice Brewer's argument in Fong Yue Ting that noncitizens
are entitled to more constitutional protections when they are residents than
when they are at the border. The majority in Mezei conceded that noncitizens
who have entered the United States have a claim to due process before they are
detained and deported, even if they had entered illegally.8 2 Mezei was detained
at the border, but his detention nevertheless attracted four dissenters. In dissent,
Justice Jackson wrote:
Fortunately it is still startling, in this country, to find a person held
indefinitely in executive custody without accusation of crime or judicial trial.
Our law may, and rightly does, place more restrictions on the alien than on
the citizen. But basic fairness in hearing procedures does not vary with the
status of the accused.
8 3
Despite the Court's approval of indefinite detention, Mezei provides objective
evidence that support on the Court for unrestrained federal immigration author-
ity had eroded since the 1890s.
77. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitu-
tional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990).
78. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
79. 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
80. Legomsky, supra note 63, at 259-60.
81. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
82. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
83. Id. at 218, 225 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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In the second half of the twentieth century, the political branches did more
than the Court to advance immigrant rights.84 In 1965 Congress overhauled the
immigration statute, removing the most egregiously racist restrictions and quo-
tas.85 The Executive Branch established the immigration courts and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).8 6 Congress and the Executive Branch have
periodically enacted provisions providing new procedures governing how immi-
grants are apprehended and processed for possible deportation.8 7 These mea-
sures led to the system described in Part IV. In brief, for noncitizens caught in
the interior of the country, ICE agents may make arrests with or without a
warrant, after which they initiate removal proceedings in immigration court.
During these proceedings, the respondent is often kept detained, and there are
limited opportunities for this detention to be reviewed.
In Part III I will explain how immigration law's parallel universe has been in
decline, though this decline was barely detectable until the twenty-first century.
But there were early signals that the Court had shifted. Although there were few
dramatic changes in doctrine, beginning in the later part of the twentieth century
there were subtle changes in the way the Court talked about plenary power.""
The clearest early indication of this transition came in 1983, in the case of INS
v. Chadha.89 The statute at issue in Chadha permitted the vote of one house of
Congress to veto the suspension of deportation by the Executive Branch. 90 The
Court struck down the legislative veto in a decision concerned more with
separation of powers than immigration. 91 This is significant because for nearly a
century the Court had treated "plenary power" as if it meant exceptional
power.92 In Chadha, the Court diluted the meaning of the word "plenary" to
simply mean any subject matter over which Congress may legislate.9 3 The
84. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1996).
85. Id. at 275.
86. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635 (2010) (describing the roles of immigration courts and the BIA in immigration adjudication).
87. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 649-59 (5th ed. 2009).
88. Professor Gabriel Chin has suggested that the Court's early, expansive descriptions of federal
immigration authority were always somewhat exaggerated because they came in cases affirming
racially discriminatory laws during a time when the Court also upheld racist laws directed at citizens.
See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our
Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000).
89. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
90. Id. at 923.
91. Id. at 952-56 ("Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked.").
92. See Legomsky, supra note 63, at 299 (arguing that the Chadha decision adopted a strategy "to
acknowledge the plenary nature of the Congressional power, but to proceed as if the word 'plenary'
were meaningless").
93. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941 ("Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive
legislative jurisdiction .... " (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819))).
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kicker in Chadha was the Court's statement that even when Congress has
plenary power, a Court must assess "whether Congress has chosen a constitution-
ally permissible means of implementing that power.",
94
In a sense, what the Court did in Chadha was to begin to normalize
immigration law within the broader context of administrative law. One interpre-
tation of traditional plenary power is that it did not create alternative constitu-
tional standards for immigration so much as it restrained courts from reviewing
immigration laws against established constitutional norms.95 Abel, where the
Court declined to strike down the immigration arrest statutes, illustrates this
pattern. Although the Court in Abel discussed the history of immigration arrest
warrants at some length, it decided that the defendant's objection to their
validity "is not entitled to our consideration" because the defendant failed to
raise the constitutional objection in the lower courts. 6 The decision fits a pattern
in which immigration measures were permitted to remain in force with light judicial
scrutiny. As we will see in Part IlI, Chadha was a critical step by which the Court
gradually reintroduced the possibility of meaningful constitutional scrutiny, setting the
stage for more dramatic changes in the twenty-first century.
In sum, the Court has acted through subtle, nuanced shifts. Consider that in
Arizona v. United States, it was essential to the Court's holding that immigration
policy was a matter for the federal government. But the Arizona majority did
not mention plenary power by name and did not cite the Chinese Exclusion
Case, nor any of the nineteenth century anti-Asian cases that came immediately
after it.97 In reiterating that the federal government has "broad" and "well
settled" authority over immigration, the Arizona court did not fall back on
powers inherent in national sovereignty.98 Instead, the Court cited enumerated
powers, specifically naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on com-
merce. 99 Thus, without ever announcing a reversal of its early immigration
cases, the Court is taking a different approach to defining the federal govern-
ment's immigration powers in the twenty-first century. 1 0 0
94. Id.
95. See Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power:
Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 33.
96. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960).
97. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
98. Id. at 2498.
99. Id. ("Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the
entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full
protection of its laws. Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful
reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad." (citations omitted)).
100. This shift in how the Court justifies the government's immigration authority is illustrated by
Justice Scalia's dissent in Arizona, where he disputed whether immigration is an enumerated power,
insisting instead that it is "inherent in sovereignty" and thus "there was no need to set forth control of
immigration as one of the enumerated powers of Congress." Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)). Oddly, although Justice Scalia denied any
connection between immigration and naturalization, he did suggest that immigration authority may be
implicitly acknowledged in the Constitution through Article I, Section Nine, which provided until 1808
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This long, slow doctrinal evolution has had an important practical impact.
The immigration enforcement structures that we have in the United States were
mostly built before this evolution in judicial doctrine had taken hold. The
statutes authorizing immigration arrests today are little changed from those that
the Court refused to review in the Abel decision in 1960. They were not
designed to withstand the kind of judicial scrutiny that now seems increasingly
likely.
III. THE DECLINE OF THE PARALLEL UNIVERSE
A. ZADVYDAS AND "IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS"
With Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether American immigration law permitted indefinite detention of nonciti-
zens who were found deportable after long periods of residence in the United
States. It was decided in 2001, almost as if at the dawn of the new century the
Court decided to signal a new approach. Zadvydas emerged from two lower
court cases concerning "lifers": people the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) believed that it could detain indefinitely-if necessary, for the
rest of their lives.10 1 One of them was Kestutis Zadvydas, who filed a writ of
habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Louisiana. 10 2 The other case involved a
group of lifers with habeas petitions in the Western District of Washington, for
which Kim Ho Ma became the named plaintiff.10 3 When the District Court of
the Western District of Washington held an en banc oral argument in June 1999,
the Chief Judge John Coughenour asked the Department of Justice attorney
why, if the government could indefinitely detain immigrants, it could not also
indefinitely detain citizens that it considered dangerous. 10 4 "Does your Constitu-
tion permit that?" he demanded. 105
The government attorney said, "No." 1
0 6
"I don't think mine does either," Judge Coughenour replied. 1
0 7
But despite Judge Coughenour's indignation (which the Supreme Court
ultimately vindicated), at the time the government's argument for indefinite
detention of immigrants was a close question. In fact, the INS lifer cases
produced a circuit split, with the Ninth Circuit granting the habeas petitions and
that Congress may not ban the importation of slaves ("[i]mportation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper"). Id. It is curious that Justice Scalia sees an evident connection
between immigration and the slave trade, but not with foreign commerce or foreign affairs.
101. See Kevin Costello, Comment, Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional
Purgatory, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 503, 504 (2001).
102. Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997).
103. Kim Ho Ma v. INS, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
104. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Kim Ho Mav. INS, 56 E Supp. 2d 1165 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (on file with author). The author was in the audience for this hearing and witnessed the exchange.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the Fifth Circuit denying them.108 The Supreme Court itself divided five to four,
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist all
dissenting. 109
There was plenty of authority for the government's position. The INA did
appear to permit indefinite detention. The reason INS lifers were detained was
that they were deportable from the United States because of their criminal
records, but no other country would take them back. 1 0 The statute authorized
ninety days of detention during a "removal period."1 1 But it went on to specify
that if the person was deemed to be a danger to the community or unlikely to
comply with eventual deportation, he or she "may be detained beyond the
removal period."'1 2 Congress provided no outer time limit on this additional
detention, and the INS interpreted this to be authorization for indefinite deten-
tion. This was not surprising given that Supreme Court had allowed indefinite
detention in the Mezei case.
1 13
In Zadvydas, the Court introduced two critical constitutional tools that con-
tinue to provide fodder for constitutional challenges to immigration law. First,
in response to the government's argument that plenary power permitted indefi-
nite detention, the Court said "that power is subject to important constitutional
limitations."1 14 For this proposition, the Court cited the Chadha decision. 
115
Second, the Court recognized that even deportable immigrants with serious
criminal records have a "liberty interest [that] is, at the least, strong enough to
raise a serious question as to whether ... the Constitution permits detention that
is indefinite and potentially permanent." 1 6 For this proposition, the Court gave
no citation, because the Court had not previously recognized that detaining
deportable or excludable noncitizens infringed a constitutional right.
1 17
These two premises have immense potential reach. On the one hand, the
Court effectively returned the plenary power doctrine to its original purpose. As
we have seen, the central question in the Chinese Exclusion Case was whether
Congress has the constitutional authority to set immigration policy at all.118 But,
having answered in the affirmative, the Court slipped quickly toward finding
that Congress has nearly unlimited power to set immigration policy, which is a
108. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 685-86 (2001) (describing the lower court decisions).
109. Id. at681.
110. Id. at 695 ("[T]he issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to
remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States.").
111. Id. at 682.
112. Id.
113. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (noting that "Mezei, like the
present cases, involves indefinite detention").
114. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 696.
117. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953) (describing indefinite
detention as "stranded in [a] temporary haven on Ellis Island").
118. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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different proposition.11 9 After a century of plenary power meaning unlimited or
nearly unreviewable power, Chadha and Zadvydas returned immigration law to
a more normal constitutional path, wherein Congress has authority, but must
still respect fundamental rights. To paraphrase the Court: federal power, subject
to constitutional limitations. 120
B. THE POWER OF AVOIDANCE
In addition to articulating new analytical tools by which to apply constitu-
tional scrutiny to immigration enforcement, Zadvydas also highlighted a path by
which to craft a remedy for the resulting constitutional problems. Reading the
majority's decision, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Justices
believed that indefinite detention is unconstitutional. 121 But that is not actually
what they held. The decision says only that indefinite detention raises "a serious
question." 122 Such a serious question triggers the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, by which the Court tries to interpret the statute "to avoid a serious
constitutional threat." 123 Using this method, the Court held that the statute
permits detention only for six months, after which there must be a hearing to
review whether there is a sufficient reason to think that deportation can be
executed in the foreseeable future. 
124
Zadvydas did not invent the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. As the
Court has explained it, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute
to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress." 125 In theory, the doctrine is intended to promote judicial
restraint because it provides an alternative for judges who might otherwise
simply strike down a statute. 126
As a canon of interpretation, constitutional avoidance has its critics.
127
Among those critiques is the view that constitutional avoidance does not really
119. See id.
120. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 ("[Immigration] power is subject to important constitutional
limitations.").
121. See id. at 690 ("A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
'depriv[e]' any 'person... of... liberty.., without due process of law.' Freedom from imprisonment-
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty
that Clause protects .... The proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they
are nonpunitive in purpose and effect. There is no sufficiently strong special justification here for
indefinite civil detention-at least as administered under this statute.").
122. Id. at 696.
123. Id. at 699.
124. Id. at 701.
125. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
126. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv.
1189, 1206-07 (2006) (describing the "judicial restraint theory" of constitutional avoidance).
127. For a useful summary of major critiques, see id. at 1208-10.
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avoid anything. In order to trigger the doctrine, the court must analyze constitu-
tional concerns, and highlight a clash between the Constitution and a statute. 121
Another problem is that the results actually encroach on the role of the
legislature by writing new judge-made rules of law. 129 By reinterpreting statutes
to avoid constitutional problems, a court may arrive at a meaning that the
legislature would not have endorsed. 130 At their core, these critiques suggest
that constitutional avoidance is not in fact a tool of judicial modesty or restraint
at all. An empirical study indicated that judges are more prone to use the
avoidance doctrine to reach policy outcomes with which they agree
ideologically. 
13 1
But the doctrine nevertheless enjoys the full and recent endorsement of the
Court. It can be an immensely powerful tool in the field of immigration,
especially at a time when Congress appears unable to enact new legislation. The
aftermath of Zadvydas illustrates this. In Zadvydas, the Court avoided directly
overruling Mezei by distinguishing it. 132 Mezei applied to noncitizens stopped at
the border, whereas Zadvydas concerned people who had entered the country. 
13 3
This was a predictable distinction, one that the Court made in Mezei. 134 But it
fell away quickly. In 2005, the Court found that Zadvydas's construction of the
statute regarding people found to be deportable also applies to noncitizens
stopped at the border because they are inadmissible. 135 Thus, although Mezei
was perhaps not directly overruled, it was rendered effectively a dead letter
through the technique of constitutional avoidance. 
136
The utility of constitutional avoidance to remedy Fourth Amendment prob-
lems with immigration law was illustrated as early as 1971 by the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the case of Au Yi Lau v. INS. 13 7 That case
concerned the validity of an immigration arrest and the ambiguous statutory
language governing the standards for such arrests. I discuss the standards
themselves below in Part IV. But for present purposes, the relevance of Au Yi
Lau is that the government conceded that the arrest provisions of the INA
should be interpreted so as to be consistent with the Constitution. 138 This led the
court to apply the probable cause standard to immigration arrests, even though
128. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 71, 87 (1995).
129. See Emily Sherwin, Rules and Judicial Review, 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 321 (2000).
130. See Schauer, supra note 128, at 74.
131. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 6 (2005).
132. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
133. Id.
134. See discussion supra Part II.C.
135. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
136. A decade before Zadvydas, Professor Hiroshi Motomura described the tendency in immigration
law for statutory interpretation to displace direct application of constitutional principles. See Motomura,
supra note 77, at 549-50.
137. 445 E2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
138. Id. at 222.
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that phrase does not appear in the statute. 139
There are two reasons why constitutional avoidance can be especially potent
in the immigration context. First, at least technically, a person challenging an
enforcement policy need not show that it is definitely unconstitutional.
140
Instead, one need only convince a court that the policy raises a serious constitu-
tional question, which the statute should be interpreted to avoid. 14 1 Second,
because there is an elaborate but not necessarily clearly written statutory and
regulatory structure in place to control immigration in the United States, it is
often possible to link a due process interest to a statute or regulation that is open
to more than one interpretation. 
142
C. THE ERODING CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
Traditionally, respondents in immigration proceedings are afforded fewer
procedural protections than criminal defendants because immigration is consid-
ered to be a form of civil adjudication. This civil-criminal distinction has been a
central part of the Court's constitutional understanding of immigration law since
Fong Yue Ting in 1893.143 It remains a primary doctrinal concept insulating
immigration policy from constitutional scrutiny. But there is good reason to
think that this insulation is thinning. 144 In order to illustrate this, I will first
examine the way the Court has dealt with Fourth Amendment claims in removal
cases, especially the application of the exclusionary rule. I will then highlight
indications in recent case law that the civil-criminal distinction is no longer as
decisive as it once was in immigration cases.
In the abstract, it has been clear since 1967 that the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of probable cause and warrants applies in the civil context as well
criminal. 145 But with regard to administrative searches, the Court has indicated
that probable cause need not always mean the same thing in every context. 146 In
the 1984 case of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court decided that the exclusionary
rule did not apply in deportation proceedings to evidence obtained from an
139. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
140. See Morrison, supra note 126, at 1202-03 (contrasting the "classical avoidance" canon and the
"modern avoidance" canon, with the latter requiring a lower level of constitutional concern).
141. One could reasonably debate whether in practice this is different in terms of how convinced a
judge must be to rule against the government on constitutional grounds. But as a technical matter, the
doctrinal requirements for constitutional avoidance are looser and less defined than for direct challenges
to statutes.
142. See, e.g., Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (using the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to construe a vague procedural rule to compel the government to provide an
immigration respondent with a copy of his "A-file").
143. See discussion supra Part II.B.
144. See Hernandez, supra note 16, at 1353-57 (illustrating the Court's failure to articulate a clear
rationale for the civil-criminal distinction, and the tendency to blur the line in recent cases); Kalhan,
supra note 16 (arguing that the convergence of criminal and immigration law has reduced the relevance
of the distinction between them).
145. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
146. See id.; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978).
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illegal arrest. 147 In the case, INS agents arrested Mexican immigrants in work-
place raids. 148 After their arrests, they effectively confessed to being in the
country unlawfully, but they later argued that the arrests were illegal, and thus
their post-arrest statements should be suppressed and their deportation proceed-
ings terminated. 149 The question was whether, if the arrests were illegal, the
exclusionary rule should apply. 
15 0
The Court noted that even if immigration proceedings were entirely equiva-
lent to criminal cases, the fact of an illegal arrest would not prevent the
proceeding from going forward.151 But on the exclusionary rule, the Court's
starting point was that "[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action."
15 2
The Court had never applied the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding. 153
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that immigration proceedings shared
some characteristics with criminal prosecutions, especially in that the arresting
officer will be motivated to use evidence in the subsequent deportation. 154
The Court identified several reasons why the exclusionary rule should not
apply in immigration court, despite seeing some close parallels to the criminal
context. First, immigration authorities typically must prove only limited facts to
obtain a deportation order, and these facts can generally be proven under
relaxed rules of evidence.15 5 Second, the Court noted that more than 97% of
immigration respondents decided not to fight their deportations, so that there
would be less deterrent value in the theoretical possibility of being able to
exclude some evidence.
15 6
Importantly, the Court did not rule on whether the arrests were illegal1 57 and
suggested that other remedies existed. 158 Although Lopez-Mendoza is the Court's
leading case about the application of the Fourth Amendment to immigration
enforcement, it only addressed the remedy for illegal arrests. 159 The case
depends implicitly on the premise that immigration arrests can theoretically
147. 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
148. Id. at 1035.
149. Id. at 1035-38.
150. Id. at 1034.
151. Id. at 1039 ("The 'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil
proceeding is never itself suppressible." (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975))).
152. Id. at 1038.
153. Id. at 1042.
154. Id. at 1042-43.
155. Id. at 1041-42.
156. Id. at 1044.
157. Id. at 1045 (suggesting declaratory relief).
158. Id. at 1050 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We do not condone any violations of the Fourth
Amendment that may have occurred in the arrests of respondents .... ").
159. Lopez-Mendoza did not apply the exclusionary rule to most Fourth Amendment violations in
immigration enforcement but left open the possibility of using the exclusionary rule in cases of
"egregious violations.., that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained." Id. at 1050-51; see also Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney Gen., 694
F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to egregious or widespread
violations of the Fourth Amendment).
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violate the Fourth Amendment because otherwise the question of applying the
exclusionary rule would have been moot. Lopez-Mendoza thus left open the
question of what constituted a valid arrest for immigration purposes.
The Court has never repudiated the civil-criminal distinction that is at the
heart of Lopez-Mendoza or Fong Yue Ting. But there are at least two indications
that the distinction is losing some of its importance. First, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that deportation could be worse than imprisonment for some
people. 160 Second, the Court has recently insisted on a strict interpretation of
deportation grounds, analogous to the interpretation of criminal statutes.
The first sign came in 2001, the same year as Zadvydas. In INS v. St. Cyr, the
Court refused to allow immigration courts to apply a retroactive rule to a
criminal plea bargain because of the strong presumption against such legisla-
tion. 161 The Court found that staying in the United States could be more
important to many people than staying out of jail. 162 The Government relied on
Lopez-Mendoza to argue that the civil nature of immigration proceedings should
permit retroactive rules, but the Court rejected this application of the civil-
criminal distinction: "[T]he presumption against retroactivity applies far beyond
the confines of the criminal law." 163 Thus, the Court minimized the importance
of characterizing deportation as nonpunitive. 164
St. Cyr laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's 2010 landmark decision
in Padilla v. Kentucky, where the Court found that failure to correctly advise a
criminal defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea bargain violated
the Sixth Amendment. 165 In Padilla, the Court again refused to extend the
civil-criminal distinction of Lopez-Mendoza. 166 The State argued that criminal
defense lawyers need not advise defendants of non-criminal consequences. 
167
But, echoing Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong Yue Ting, the Court in Padilla
concluded that deportation is often a more severe consequence than prison. 168
Padilla suggests that the determinative issue is the functional consequences of
adjudication-imprisonment and deportation-not whether these consequences
had been labeled as civil or criminal.
160. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001).
161. Id. at 315-16.
162. See id. at 323.
163. Id. at 324.
164. Id. ("[O]ur mere statement that deportation is not punishment for past crimes does not mean
that we cannot consider an alien's reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary
relief from deportation when deciding whether the elimination of such relief has a retroactive effect.").
165. 559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010).
166. Id. at 365 ("Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless
intimately related to the criminal process." (internal citation omitted)).
167. Brief of Respondent at 7, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2473880, at *7
("Neither this Court nor the federal circuits have held that the trial court or defense counsel must inform
defendants of all possible consequences flowing from a guilty plea. The only duty of the trial court is to
ensure that the defendant understands the 'direct' consequences of the plea.").
168. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
[Vol. 104:125
2015] IMMIGRATION LAW'S LOOMING FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM 149
In Padilla, the Court noted that plea bargains account for "nearly 95% of all
criminal convictions." 169 This fact calls into question one of the central ratio-
nales for not applying the exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza. In that earlier
case, the Court reasoned that the high rate of voluntary deportations in immigra-
tion court lessened the deterrent potential of the exclusionary rule. 170 But
voluntary deportations are the immigration equivalent of a guilty plea in
criminal court. Now that the Court has recognized the generally high rate of
criminal plea bargaining, it appears to have undermined one of the rationales for
distinguishing immigration and criminal proceedings in Lopez-Mendoza. 
17 1
The second sign that the civil-criminal distinction has eroded can be seen in
recent litigation about criminal grounds for deportation, in which the Supreme
Court has required a far more strict application of the immigration statute than
one might have expected a few decades earlier. In 1952 in Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, the Court cited the civil-criminal distinction to explain why the
rule against ex post facto laws did not apply to grounds of deportation. 172 The
question in Harisiades was about how broadly the government could apply a
statute calling for noncitizen Communists to be deported. 173 The statute made
members of the Communist Party deportable, but Harisiades ceased to formally
be a member before it was enacted. 174 More than merely about an ex post facto
law, Harisiades concerned the question of whether the government could
broadly apply deportation laws that were based on Congressional concern about
public safety. 175 In Harisiades, the Court said yes.
An analogous question has arisen recently about the application of criminal
grounds of deportation, where immigration judges are called on to decide
whether convictions under state criminal laws constitute aggravated felonies,
crimes involving moral turpitude, or other deportable offenses as defined in
federal law. The central problem in these cases is that state criminal statutes are
often different than their federal analogues. For instance, the federal definition
of "burglary" is not always the same as some state law definitions of the
crime. 176 As recently as 2008, the Attorney General issued a decision in In re
169. Id. at 372.
170. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
171. It might also be noted that the government does not provide legal counsel in immigration
proceedings. Thus, it is conceivable that more immigration respondents would raise constitutional
objections if they had representation.
172. 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) ("[E]ven if the Act were found to be retroactive, to strike it down
would require us to overrule the construction of the ex post facto provision .... It always has been
considered that that which it forbids is penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punish-
ment for conduct lawful previous to its enactment. Deportation, however severe its consequences, has
been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure." (footnotes omitted)).
173. Id. at581.
174. Id. at 582.
175. See id. at 591 ("We think that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify the Government's power of
deportation.").
176. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990).
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Silva-Trevino calling for immigration judges confronting such cases to review
not just the record of conviction, but any other probative evidence from a
criminal case-including police reports and witness statements that had never
been subject to cross examination-to decide if a deportable crime had been
committed. 177 This approach seems in sync with Harisiades, where the Court
permitted a generally flexible approach to applying removal grounds against
people who might pose a threat to American communities. But it has not fared
well in the federal courts of the twenty-first century. 178 In its 2013 term, the
Supreme Court held that in most cases immigration courts must restrict their
analysis to a strict comparison of the state and federal statutes at issue. 179 In
April 2015, Attorney General Eric Holder rescinded the Silva-Trevino decision,
noting that the Court's categorical approach to interpreting grounds of removal
"cast doubt" on the looser approach in that seven-year-old decision. 8 o
The civil-criminal distinction, as the Court articulated it in 1893, created an
overly simplistic analytical approach. The recent rise of mass-scale detention of
immigrants with criminal records has given immigration enforcement a strongly
punitive cast, making it more difficult to plausibly consider immigration enforce-
ment entirely distinct from criminal punishment.181 At the same time, the Court
seems to be shifting focus away from formalistic differences in process, and
instead focusing on the weight of the interest at stake. 18 2 Understanding deporta-
tion as a severe measure-regardless of whether it is intended as a punishment-
becomes a powerful argument for more procedural protections under a due
process analysis. 18 3 But for present purposes, deportation is not the main
concern because that would come only after the conclusion of removal proceed-
ings. The concern with immigration arrests is the immediate and continuing
deprivation of liberty while the case is pending. This is a concern in criminal
cases just as it is in immigration. The Fourth Amendment speaks directly to this
concern in both the civil and criminal context.
D. REASONS FOR CAUTION
Zadvydas and Padilla seem to herald a new approach, and they certainly open
up constitutional questions about immigration enforcement that not long ago
seemed foreclosed. I will highlight some of these looming questions below in
Part IV. But it is important to first raise a note of caution. There have been false
starts in the past where observers thought they saw signs of a new approach
177. In re Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 687 (A.G. 2008).
178. See, e.g., Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Olivas-Motta v. Holder,
746 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2013).
179. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013).
180. In re Silva-Trevino in Removal Proceedings, Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 10, 2015).
181. See generally Hemndez, supra note 16, at 1353-57.
182. See generally Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33
CARDOZO L. REv. 491 (2011) (arguing that due process analysis calls for more procedural protections in
immigration proceedings because of the severity of deportation).
183. Id. at498.
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from the Court in an immigration case only to be disappointed. 18 4 Although the
Court now acknowledges that detention of immigrants and deportation raise
weighty constitutional concerns, we do not yet know how far the Court will be
willing to go with this analysis. There are cases indicating that the Court may
be cautious.
One of these cases came a decade before Zadvydas. In Reno v. Flores, the
Court approved the government's policy of keeping noncitizens in "custody"
pending their deportation hearings. 18 5 I put the word custody in quotes because
its meaning in the context of that case is somewhat ambiguous. In Flores, the
habeas petitioners were children who arrived in the United States unaccompa-
nied. 18 6 They were held in custody by the INS because there was no one
immediately available to assume responsibility for their care.18 7 Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court stated: "[T]he INS cannot simply send them off into the
night."188 Instead, the INS placed them in a youth shelter. 8 9
In this unique context, the Court found that the means by which the INS took
the children into custody met procedural due process requirements. The petition-
ers argued, and the lower courts held, that the procedures violated due process
because the INS used a system of warrantless arrests, without any automatic or
timely review by an immigration judge.1 90 Instead, each minor would have to
affirmatively request a hearing.1 91 That the Court rejected this objection is
significant because warrantless arrests without automatic, timely hearings in
front of immigration judges remain the standard today for noncitizens arrested
and taken into custody by DHS on immigration grounds. 192 Thus, if one adopts
a broad reading of Flores, it could be that the Court approved warrantless
arrests without automatic judicial review in the context of immigration
enforcement.
But there are two good reasons not to read Flores so broadly. First, the Court
noted that it was ruling only on a facial challenge to the custody policy, and that
it was leaving unresolved whether "excessive delay" in holding a hearing in a
specific case might raise a different constitutional question. 193 Second, the
Court took pains to emphasize that it did not understand the children at issue in
Flores to be detained, even though the applicable regulations categorized them
184. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 77, at 547-48 (describing disappointment after the plenary
power doctrine was critiqued in the 1980s).
185. 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993).
186. Id. at 294.
187. Id. at 295.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 297.
190. Id. at 308.
191. Id. at 309.
192. See discussion infra Part IVA.
193. Flores, 507 U.S. at 309.
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that way for administrative purposes. 194 The Court instead said that the proper
terminology was "legal custody," noting that the applicable regulations allowed
the children to be placed in a detention facility for no more than seventy-two
hours, and even then only in separate juvenile facilities. 195 Analogizing the INS
custody arrangements to state orphanages, the Court rejected the petitioner's
claims that their liberty interests were infringed:
The "freedom from physical restraint" invoked by respondents is not at issue
in this case. Surely not in the sense of shackles, chains, or barred cells....
... We are unaware, however, that any court-aside from the courts
below-has ever held that a child has a constitutional right not to be placed in
a decent and humane custodial institution if there is available a responsible
person unwilling to become the child's legal guardian but willing to undertake
temporary legal custody.' 96
Flores thus appears to be quite distinguishable from Zadvydas, where deten-
tion with barred cells was the central question. It seems reasonable to presume
that with a greater deprivation of liberty at issue, there might be a stronger due
process argument for more stringent procedural safeguards. Nevertheless, Flores
represents the Court's most direct engagement with the procedural means by
which noncitizens are taken into custody and initially held, and the system
survived scrutiny.
A second case suggesting a cautious approach came after Zadvydas. A central
feature of modern immigration enforcement is the congressionally-mandated
policy of mandatory enforcement by which noncitizens who have committed
certain crimes "shall" be taken into custody while their cases are pending in
immigration court. 19 7 This policy makes immigration detention far more harsh
than state pretrial criminal detention often is, because in state criminal courts
defendants often have a right to a bail setting even when facing charges for a
violent offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the mandatory detention policy in
Demore v. Kim, two years after Zadvydas.1 98 The Court distinguished Zadvydas
because this case concerned pre-removal order detention, and because, in
theory, pre-order detention would be short in duration.1 99 Zadvydas, by contrast,
concerned indefinite detention after a removal order had been issued. The Court
relied on statistics showing that nearly all immigration court cases are resolved
within a month, and within five months in the case of appeals.20 0 In this context
the Court found that Congress could make a generally applicable decision that
194. Id. at 298 ("Juveniles placed in these facilities are deemed to be in INS detention 'because of
issues of payment and authorization of medical care."').
195. Id.
196. Id. at 302-03.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
198. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
199. Id. at 527-31.
200. Id. at 530.
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certain deportable persons pose a risk of absconding without requiring an
individual hearing. 20 1 However, the reach of this holding has been limited, at
least in the Ninth Circuit, because immigration cases often take longer to
resolve than the Court assumed in Demore. 2
In Demore, the Court reiterated that in immigration, "Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. 20 3 But this begs
the question: When may immigration policy depart from the constitutional
limitations that apply elsewhere? Demore focused on the narrow question of
whether Congress could deny bond to class of deportable noncitizens with
criminal records. 20 4 But the case did not ask the Court to address how-or,
more importantly, who-should determine that a person belongs in this disfa-
vored class. In Demore, "[r]espondent [did] not dispute the validity of his prior
convictions ..... Respondent also did not dispute the INS' conclusion that he is
subject to mandatory detention under [the statute]. ' ' 2° 5 The respondent did not
even dispute the conclusion that he was ultimately deportable.2 °6 This scenario
made the government's concern that the respondent might abscond especially
sympathetic. But a more difficult situation would be raised by a respondent
subjected to mandatory detention who insists either that she is not deportable or
is not in the category of convicted criminals who are subject to such deten-
tion.20 7 Such a scenario could arise if DHS were to errantly charge a U.S.
citizen with being a noncitizen, or if a noncitizen had grounds to contest
whether a particular criminal conviction constituted an aggravated felony.208 In
such a situation, a respondent in immigration custody may ask for something
known as a Joseph hearing, which I will discuss in Part IV.A. 20 9 But the Court
made clear that because the respondent in Demore did not claim any defenses,
,.we have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph hearings generally., 2 10
This remains an open question today.
Rather than suggesting a unique standard for immigration cases, Demore is
consistent with United States v. Salerno, a case about criminal pretrial deten-
201. Id. at518-21,528.
202. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir 2013) (holding that Zadvydas requires
a bond hearing once pre-order detention lasts beyond six months); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (prolonged detention while a respondent petitions in
federal court for review of a removal order requires a bond hearing). See generally Anello, supra note
16.
203. Demore, 538 U.S. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
204. See id. at 513.
205. Id. at513-14.
206. Id. at514.
207. See id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he relevant statutes literally say nothing about an
individual who, armed with a strong argument against deportability, might, or might not, fall within
their terms.").
208. For relevant examples, see infra note 281.
209. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 & n.3.
210. Id. at514n.3.
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tion.2 11 In Salerno, much as in Demore, the Court affirmed Congress's authority
to insist on pretrial detention for a certain class of defendants.212 Thus, a
challenge focusing on the right to bond faces a difficult road. If anything,
Salerno supports the claim that the civil-criminal distinction is fading in impor-
tance. The starting point for the Court's analysis in Salerno was that pretrial
detention in a criminal case is "regulatory" in nature.213 In support of its
holding, it cited two immigration cases, along with cases on involuntary confine-
ment based on mental illness.2 14 The Court's view thus seems to be that
although imprisonment post-conviction as a criminal punishment may be a
unique category, other types of detention are governed by a common set of
principles.215
From this premise, it would seem logical to scrutinize immigration detention
according to the same constitutional rules that govern other regulatory forms of
detention. Demore and Salerno stand for the rule that Congress may designate a
particular class of people for mandatory detention while their cases are pending
based on a presumption of flight risk or dangerousness. 216 But this does not
address the procedural safeguards required to determine whether a person
actually belongs in this disfavored class. In Salerno, the Court stressed that the
pretrial detention applied only if the government could demonstrate probable
cause and "convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence
that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community
or any person. 217 Immigration detention procedures fall far short of these
safeguards, as we shall see in Part IV.
As we have seen in Part II, federal courts have already found immigration
procedures to be constitutionally deficient when local police rely on them to
detain people on immigration grounds. If it is a constitutional problem for state
and local police to detain a person on immigration grounds without an indepen-
dent finding of probable cause, what about when federal immigration officers do
the same thing? Before answering this question, it is important to add one
further note of caution.
211. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
212. Id. at 755 ("The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious
felonies .... We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that
primary concern of every government-a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens-on
its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.").
213. Ild. at 748.
214. Id. at 748-49 (citing, inter alia, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (immigration); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (immigration); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
(involuntary commitment).
215. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 553 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority in Zadvydas did
not reject noncitizen's "constitutionally protected liberty interest"); Frances M. Kreimer, Note, Danger-
ousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1485, 1504 (2012).
216. Demore, 538 U.S. at531; Salerno,481 U.S. at751.
217. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
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Because the national government has plenary power to set immigration
policy, the Court has shown some inclination to apply certain constitutional
protections more stringently to state measures than to federal policies. This
phenomenon can be seen most clearly in equal protection cases. As early as
1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court made clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment could protect noncitizens.2 18 In 1973, with In re Griffiths, the Court
found that alienage was a "suspect classification" and thus "[bore] a heavy
burden of justification." 2 19 Most importantly, in Plyler v. Doe, a divided Court
struck down, five to four, a Texas law restricting unauthorized immigrant
children from attending public school, and rejected the opportunity to conclude
that they constituted a suspect class. 2 20 The Court called for heightened scrutiny
because of the fundamental role of primary education in modern society and the
reality that large, unauthorized immigrant populations "raise[] the specter of a
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens. 2 2 1 Yet the Court limited the
reach of this holding by conceding that in general a state "may withhold its
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the
product of their own unlawful conduct. 2 22
As Professor Hiroshi Motomura points out, it is impossible to understand
how the Court has used the Equal Protection Clause with regard to immigrants
without considering the lens of federalism, which is why the Court regards
differentiation by states as suspect.223 There is reason to think that federalism
should have more impact in an equal protection context than it would in a case
about the government's power to detain a person without judicial review. The
foundation of immigration law is to differentiate citizens from all others.224 The
federal authority to set immigration policy can thus be understood as a limited
exception to equal protection, permitting discrimination based on alienage for a
particular purpose. But although such an exception from the guarantee of equal
protection is necessary to establish immigration policy, it is not as clear that a
similar exception needs to be made to constitutional protections against arbi-
trary deprivation of liberty. Establishing a uniform national immigration policy
does not inherently require unreasonable searches and seizures or confinement
without due process. Nevertheless, it is probably not an accident that the
constitutional difficulties with immigration arrests were recognized first in suits
against localities. Courts are likely to proceed with more caution when the
218. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
219. 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (internal quotations omitted).
220. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
221. Id. at218-19.
222. Id. at 219.
223. See Motomura, supra note 77, at 566.
224. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 341, 343
(2008) ("For over a century, every effort by courts and scholars to draw a conceptual distinction
between immigrant- selecting rules and rules that affect immigrants' behavior outside the selection
context (immigrant-regulating rules) has been an utter failure.").
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argument is applied to federal authorities, though there appears to be no sound
reason why the same analysis cannot apply to the federal government as well.
IV. IMMIGRATION ARRESTS COMPARED TO OTHER AREAS OF LAW
A. WARRANTS WITHOUT JUDGES
The manner by which the government should seek to deport a noncitizen
found in the interior of the country is set out in the INA. The statute provides
that removal proceedings shall be initiated by ICE issuing a "Notice to Appear"
(NTA), which is the immigration court equivalent of an indictment.225 The NTA
sets out the grounds for which DHS believes the person should be removed from the
country, for instance being unlawfully present in the country, or, for a legal resident,
committing a removable criminal offense. 226 These NTAs can be served on respon-
dents out of custody. However, the constitutional problems that this Article focuses on
relate to cases where the respondent is taken into ICE custody and detained.
An important clarification is relevant here. There already exists a significant
body of law and scholarship regarding the suppression of evidence obtained
through immigration arrests that violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 7 This area of
law is governed by Lopez-Mendoza, which focused only on the use of evidence
obtained through illegal arrests in immigration cases.2 28 But Lopez-Mendoza
was about the exclusionary rule. 2 9 It leaves open the question as to whether
immigration arrests may generally constitute an unreasonable seizure in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.
A critical issue here concerns the nature of immigration arrest warrants,
which are a routine part of the initiation of the immigration detention and
removal process. The statute provides: "On a warrant issued by the Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States. 2 30 Such a warrant is required
unless there is inadequate time to obtain a one.2 31 The statute then provides that
detention will be mandatory, with no release on bond, if the person has
committed an aggravated felony or certain other crimes.2 32 In other cases, ICE
may release the respondent on bond. 33
225. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012).
226. Id. § 1229(a)(1) (setting out the content of the NTA).
227. See generally AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW (2015); Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013); Jennifer
M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010).
228. See supra text accompanying note 147.
229. See discussion supra Part III.C.
230. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
231. See id. § 1357(a)(2).
232. Id. § 1226(c).
233. See id. § 1226(a). The statutory references to "Attorney General" can create a certain degree of
confusion in delineating the roles played today by DHS and the Department of Justice. At the time
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In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court said that "the warrant
machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment" would normally call for an
administrative search or seizure to "be reviewed by a neutral magistrate. ' 234 In
the criminal context the term "warrants" implies the involvement of a judicial
officer, providing a neutral check on the powers of police. Typically a police
officer would sign a statement requesting a warrant and attesting to the grounds
justifying it. The judge would then review the officer's request. Immigration
arrest warrants do not include review and authorization by a judicial officer, nor
by any other neutral adjudicator such as an immigration judge. In immigration
enforcement, the "warrant" issues with the officer's signature alone.
For a warrantless arrest, the immigration statute requires only that the person
arrested "shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an
officer of the Service. 235 The applicable regulations provide that this review
must be "by an officer other than the arresting officer., 236 This is the closest
existing rules come to providing an immediate neutral review of the arrest.
There is no other specific requirement for a neutral review of the arrest. The
mere requirement that another ICE officer review an arrest would be analogous
to allowing police detectives to have their warrantless arrests reviewed by
fellow detectives in the same department.
In the context of criminal arrests, the Court has found review by a prosecutor
inadequately neutral to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.23 7 There is an analogous
procedural requirement in the immigration regulations that when ICE issues an
immigration arrest warrant it must also issue an NTA to initiate removal
proceedings.238 These proceedings ultimately should provide a hearing and
adjudication with clearer standards and a neutral decision maker. In order to
issue a removal order, an immigration judge ultimately must find that DHS has
proven its case by clear and convincing evidence. 239 But at the time of arrest,
this adjudication may be weeks away and may not be completed for months.
Congress enacted these provisions, both the immigration courts (housed in the Executive Office for
Immigration Review) and the INS fell under the mandate of the Attorney General. As a result, both the
adjudicatory and the enforcement arms of the federal government were within the same federal
department. This ceased to be the case in 2002, when the enforcement functions were shifted to DHS
through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). However,
Congress did not comb through the INA and replace every reference to the Attorney General with DHS
as needed. Instead, Congress enacted a single provision to govern the new division of labor, codified at
Section 103 of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1103. Section 1103 provides that the Attorney General's authority
now shall be limited to those that were exercised by EOIR before the establishment of the DHS. Id.
§ 1103(g). Most other functions previously carried out by INS have been transferred to DHS. Id.
§ 1103(a)(1). However, there is an additional provision that the Attorney General retains authority to
make rulings on questions of law. Id. § 1103(a)(1).
234. 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
236. 8 C.ER. § 287.3 (2012).
237. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
238. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b). An NTA relates to civil violations and simply charges an immigrant with
being removable; it does not establish probable cause of removability.
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(3)(A).
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There is already case law from at least one court of appeals finding that when
a person is detained at the border for more than forty-eight hours, there must be
a review by a neutral judicial officer.2 40 ICE's practice of routinely arresting and
detaining people in the interior of the country without any prompt review by a
neutral adjudicator certainly seems to raise a serious constitutional question.
The lack of immigration judge involvement in the warrant process contrasts
with the role of these judges in setting bond for the detainees not subject to
mandatory detention, which is a routine immigration court function.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE?
Current law contains ambiguity about the standard that must be met to justify
an immigration arrest. There is no explicit requirement for probable cause when
ICE issues immigration arrest warrants. The applicable statute authorizes an
ICE officer "to arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe
that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his
arrest.,
24 1
The statute thus only provides a standard for warrantless arrests: "reason to
believe." z 2 In the case of warrantless arrests, the applicable regulations also
provide that there must be "prima facie evidence" that the person is unlawfully
present.243 The regulations thus potentially add to confusion by introducing an
alternative formulation of the standard for an immigration arrest. They go into
considerable detail about which types of officers may issue a warrant or execute
an arrest but do not explicitly resolve the fundamental ambiguity about the
standard that should be required to issue and arrest. 244
The difficulty is one of clarity and implementation. In Au Yi Lau, the D.C.
Circuit held that the reason to believe standard should be understood as equiva-
lent to probable cause.2 45 Several other circuits have adopted the same interpre-
tation.246 Thus, whereas the doctrinal question may appear resolved at the level
of the circuit courts, probable cause is still not the explicit standard used in
regulations. Moreover, some cases indicate that probable cause may not mean
the same thing in administrative searches as it does in criminal investigations.
247
Nor was probable cause referred to on the forms that immigration officers
must complete to issue a warrant to validate an arrest in 2014. Immigration
240. United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993).
241. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
242. See id. § 1357(a)(2) (authorizing arrests without warrants).
243. 8 C.ER. § 287.3.
244. See id. § 287.5(e).
245. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217,222 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
246. See United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 62 n.13 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Au Yi Lau); Lee v.
INS, 590 E2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975)
(same).
247. See Chac6n, supra note 227, at 1608.
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arrest warrants are issued on an 1-200 form,24 8 in which the officer warrants:
"from evidence submitted to me, it appears that ... is within the
country in violation of the immigration laws and is therefore liable to be taken
into custody .... 249 The operative standard here is "appears," but it is not clear
how this standard compares to more established ones like probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. On the basis of plain language, appears does not seem to
be a high standard.
Even assuming that the standard is probable cause, there is another layer of
potential confusion. What should the probable cause be for? The most obvious
answer would appear to be probable cause that the person is removable from the
United States. But the 1-200 form also refers to its subject as "liable to being
taken into custody., 25 0 In practice, this is a circular standard: the ICE officer
signing the form is also likely making the custody determination at the same
time. But the form masks an important issue. Not every person subject to
potential removal is subject to mandatory detention. Unless the person has
committed certain crimes, she may be eligible for release while her removal
case is pending. 251
A second form typically issued with the 1-200 is the 1-286, or "Notice of
Custody Determination. 25 2 Thus, the determination that someone is "liable to
be taken into custody" requires an officer to do no more than anticipate her own
decision which is made at exactly the same time. The Notice of Custody
Determination illustrates other peculiarities of immigration enforcement. This
form is served on the arrested respondent, who has the opportunity on the same
form to request a custody or bond redetermination by an immigration judge.25 3
But the ICE officer has the option of simply checking a box that states, "You
may not request a review of this determination by an Immigration Judge
because the Immigration and Nationality Act prohibits your release from cus-
tody.",25 4 An ICE officer would check this box if she believes that the respon-
dent is subject to mandatory detention. Thus, in immigration enforcement, the
police agency making the arrest has the power to also make an initial determina-
tion that judicial review should not be available.
An ICE determination that mandatory detention applies will delay but not
entirely preclude neutral review. In the 1999 case of In re Joseph, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) clarified that immigration judges have jurisdiction
to determine whether a respondent is actually subject to mandatory detention.25 5
248. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1).
249. U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FORM 1-200,
WARRANT FOR ARREST OF ALIEN (2007).
250. Id.
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
252. U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FORM 1-286,
NOTICE OF CUSTODY DETERMINATION (2007).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
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But there are three significant limitations on the impact of such Joseph hear-
ings.25 6 First, the detained respondent must request the hearing, even after
having received an official form that misleadingly says that "you may not"
request review by an immigration judge. 7
Second, there is no required timeline or deadline by which a Joseph hearing
must take place if requested. The BIA recognized this implicitly in Joseph by
noting that, in some cases, the immigration judge will have made a final ruling
on the merits of the removal case before even reaching the custody question.25 8
This is what happened in Joseph: the respondent was taken into custody in
November 1998, and the immigration judge terminated the removal proceedings
and ordered his release on January 20, 1999.259 Mr. Joseph thus spent approxi-
mately two months detained without legal basis and without any opportunity for
earlier judicial review.
The third problem is that the BIA sets a strikingly high standard for respon-
dents to meet in order to prevail in a Joseph hearing when immigration judges
address custody before the removal case is fully adjudicated. 260 Note that in a
Joseph hearing, the detainee is simply seeking the opportunity to request release
on bond. DHS would still be able to argue that bond should be denied or set at a
high level either to ensure the respondent's appearance or to protect public
safety.2 61 Nevertheless, in order to prevail in a Joseph hearing,
[T]he Immigration Judge must have very substantial grounds to override the
custodial effect of the Service's charge....
... In requiring that the Immigration Judge be convinced that the Service is
substantially unlikely to prevail on its charge, when making this determination
before the resolution of the underlying case, we provide both significant
weight to the Service's "reason to believe" that led to the charge and genuine
life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge's reexamination of
this issue.2 62
As Professor Geoffrey Heeren cogently describes,"[t]he burden of proof in
the proceeding is placed on the party with the least resources .... Thus,
whereas the BIA authorized immigration judges to "make an independent
determination" about the legality of mandatory detention in a particular case, it
also asked them to effectively defer to the police agency that first put the person
256. See also Sayed, supra note 16, at 1852 (describing the deficiencies of Joseph Hearings).
257. U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 252.
258. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 800.
259. Id. at 801.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 806 ("A determination in favor of an alien on this issue does not lead to automatic
release. It simply allows an Immigration Judge to consider the question of bond under the custody
standards of section 236(a) of the Act.").
262. Id. at 806-07.
263. Heeren, supra note 16, at 604.
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in detention by giving "significant weight" to the DHS's view.
2 6 4
In addition to the inherent tension between independence on the one hand and
deference on the other, In re Joseph eschews explicit invocation of the estab-
265lished standards that are well known in criminal procedure. Much as the
reason to believe standard has been interpreted as equivalent to probable cause,
it is possible that the BIA's "substantial grounds to override" standard is, for
practical purposes, similar to the probable cause standard, which is itself quite
favorable to the prosecution. As the Supreme Court noted "probable cause is a
fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. 2 66
Moreover, there is some overlap in terminology used by the Supreme Court to
define the standard for probable cause reviews.2 67 Although the Joseph standard
and probable cause may be synonymous, the BIA and the Attorney General
have left the question open to ambiguity.
C. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT COMPARED TO CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The system used today to arrest and detain people for immigration enforce-
ment purposes simply could not exist in its current form if it were not for the
way the Supreme Court shielded immigration law from constitutional scrutiny
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To illustrate this, I will start with
criminal procedure. As we have seen, immigration arrests are made without
warrants issued by neutral magistrates. 268 In immigration, "warrants" are signed
only by the law enforcement agency, so that in criminal law terms immigration
enforcement makes warrantless arrests the norm.26 9 On the surface, this is
different from criminal procedure because the Supreme Court has expressed a
preference for warrants to be issued before arrests in the criminal context.2 70
But this difference may be of little practical consequence, because in criminal
law enforcement warrantless arrests are permissible and commonplace for
minor crimes, so long as a "policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable
cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime. 27 1
The important divergence between criminal law and immigration law is about
what happens after the initial arrest. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court recognized
that once a person is in custody, "the suspect's need for a neutral determination
264. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 807.
265. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) ("The standard for arrest is probable cause,
defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
(suspect) had committed or was committing an offense." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
266. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
267. See id. at 238 (reviewing court should ensure that a magistrate had a "substantial basis" for
concluding that probable cause existed).
268. See discussion supra Part IVA.
269. See id.
270. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
271. Id. at 113-14; see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
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of probable cause increases significantly., 272 In Gerstein, the State of Florida
argued that the charges filed by the prosecutor should be sufficient to justify
pretrial detention.273 The Court rejected this because it did "not think prosecuto-
rial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment., 274 Since the 1940s, the Court has been emphatic about the need for a
neutral magistrate's review of probable cause because, in Justice Frankurter's
words, "[z]eal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness
of judgment.... The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted
to a single functionary.
'
,
2 7 5
Deprivation of liberty can violate the Fourth Amendment's bar against unrea-
sonable seizures-in this case, of a person.276 The Court long ago recognized
that pretrial detention has serious human consequences because it "may imperil
the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relation-
ships. 277 For these reasons, the Court held that "[w]hen the stakes are this high,
the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with
liberty., 278 The Court later clarified that a neutral probable cause review must
take place within forty-eight hours of arrest.
279
The central issues here are neutrality, time, and automaticity. The Court's
reasoning in Gerstein should be pertinent to immigration enforcement because
Gerstein focuses on the narrow issue of pretrial custody, which raises concerns
under the Fourth Amendment. As we have seen in Salerno, the Court appears to
consider immigration detention to be similar to pretrial criminal detention,
labeling them both "regulatory., 280 Gerstein does not deal with other procedural
protections that are specific to criminal trials, such as the Sixth Amendment's
rights to a jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, and appointed counsel. 281 The
neutral probable cause review that is required under the Fourth Amendment is
not even necessarily an adversarial proceeding and does not necessarily impli-
cate the defendant's right to counsel.282 The Court insisted on a neutral probable
cause review but stressed that states have considerable flexibility to design their
own criminal procedures.283
272. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
273. Id. at 116-17.
274. Id. at 117.
275. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943); see also Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
276. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14
277. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
278. Id.
279. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
280. See discussion supra Part I1D.
281. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding a
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants).
282. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123-24.
283. Id.
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The lack of prompt, neutral review for probable cause in immigration enforce-
ment can have real consequences if DHS officers prove fallible. For example, in
a case handled by the author through the Immigration Clinic at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, a lawful permanent resident was initially detained and
issued an NTA in 2013 based on a criminal conviction. The immigration court
did not hold a hearing until forty-three days after the initial arrest. At that
hearing, the immigration judge found there was no legal basis for removal or for
detention. But since DHS reserved appeal, the respondent was left in custody.
Because DHS had thirty days to decide whether to appeal, a legally baseless
arrest nevertheless produced roughly two-and-a-half months of detention.28 4 In
Gerstein, the Florida procedure, which the Court found insufficient, would have
provided for a preliminary hearing after just thirty days.28 5
In McNabb v. United States, Justice Frankfurter expressed concern about "the
misuse of the law enforcement process" and "the dangers of the overzealous as
well as the despotic. 28 6 Given that guarding against abuse of power is always a
central concern of the Constitution, it is worth taking note of the degree to
which immigration enforcement today is a gap in our constitutional armor. If a
despotic federal official were to baselessly accuse a person of murder in order
put him behind bars, a neutral magistrate would be reviewing the case within
forty-eight hours.2 87 But if that despotic federal official were to instead simply
accuse the person of being in the country unlawfully, much more time-
possibly weeks or months-might go by before the case was reviewed by a
neutral immigration judge, especially if the person did not know to ask for a
Joseph hearing.
To see the need for a neutral review of immigration custody, one need not
accuse DHS of willfully seeking to wrongfully arrest people on immigration
grounds. One need only imagine that immigration officers are human and that
they sometimes make mistakes. There have been confirmed reports of United
States citizens being errantly detained and deported because of mistakes in the
process.288 Guarding against unintentional errors with grave human conse-
quences is alone a good reason to add a neutral review early in the process.
The procedural safeguards involved in immigration arrests fall far short of
those required in criminal arrests, especially in terms of how much time may
284. Based on personal knowledge of the case and on the oral decision of the immigration judge
(confidential, on file with author).
285. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106; see also Cnty. Of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)
(requiring probable cause review within forty-eight hours).
286. 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
287. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
288. See Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental Compe-
tence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 932 (2014); see also William Finnegan, The
Deportation Machine: A Citizen Trapped in the System, THE NEW YORKER (April 29, 2013), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-machine; Mark Reaman, Immigration Officers
Detain Citizen for Days Without Formal Charges, CRESTED BUTTE NEWS (March 4, 2015), http://
crestedbuttenews.com/?option-com content&task-view&id-6272.
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pass before the decision to keep someone detained is reviewed by a neutral
magistrate. There is considerable persuasive appeal in this comparison. Unlike
prison after sentencing, pretrial detention cannot be justified as a form of
punishment, which makes it more analogous to immigration detention. More to
the point, one can reasonably ask why someone detained on murder charges
should get more procedural protection than someone detained merely on admin-
istrative charges of being unlawfully present in the country. Unlike other
amendments, the Fourth Amendment's text does not limit the protection against
unreasonable seizures to criminal cases.28 9
D. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT COMPARED TO INVOLUNTARY MENTAL
HEALTH COMMITMENT
Immigration arrest procedures fall short not only in comparison with criminal
procedures, but also in comparison with civil confinement law. If criminal
procedure were the only comparison, there would be an immediate objection
that it is simply inappropriate to compare immigration and criminal detention.
As explained in Part IV.C, there is reason to think that the civil-criminal
distinction is declining in influence, though it has not disappeared. If the Court
continues to move toward an approach rooted in due process analysis, the
critical procedural question would be the weight of the interest at stake.290 In
this framework, it matters much less whether a process is formally labeled
criminal or civil. Detention inherently burdens fundamental liberty rights and
has a drastic impact on people's lives, and thus should trigger heightened
procedural protections.
Nevertheless, because of the continued relevance of the civil-criminal distinc-
tion, a useful comparison may also be made between immigration and involun-
tary commitment on the basis of mental illness. Like immigration, involuntary
commitment involves deprivation of liberty but is not premised on a desire for
punishment and has historically been subject to more relaxed methods of
adjudication than criminal cases.29 1 Much as in immigration detention, states
sometimes allow emergency commitment based on an authorization from a
police officer or clinician.2 92 But in this comparison, we can see again immigra-
tion enforcement offering much less procedural protection.
289. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... "), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ").
290. See Traum, supra note 182 (arguing for a due process-based approach to immigrants' constitu-
tional rights).
291. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) ("There are significant reasons why different
standards of proof are called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal prosecu-
tions.").
292. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 736 (5th ed. 2009).
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The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases about civil commitment,
most of them focusing on the substantive standards required by the Constitu-
tion. In Addington v. Texas, the Court acknowledged that civil commitments do
not require the same procedures as criminal cases. 2 9 3 But the Court nevertheless
found that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant depriva-
tion of liberty that requires due process protection., 294 The holding in Adding-
ton was that civil commitment requires a clear and convincing standard of proof
and that preponderance of the evidence is too low a standard given the weight
of the due process interests.2 95 The Court considered this conclusion to be a kind of
balance because it also found that the Constitution did not necessarily require a
criminal law burden of proof for civil commitment.2 96 Addington offers an interesting
basis for comparison with immigration detention, which involves a similar depriva-
tion of liberty. It is instructive that Congress has set an identical standard of proof-
clear and convincing evidence-for immigration hearings.297
In 1982, the Second Circuit rebuffed an appeal seeking to require a probable
cause hearing within forty-eight hours for involuntary civil commitment, rely-
ing on the premise that non-criminal deprivations of liberty do not require the
same procedural protection. 298 But under most state procedural systems, a
neutral decision maker must review the case after seventy-two hours at most.
2 9 9
According to one survey, there are eight states that may allow involuntary
commitment without a neutral review for more time-up to 7 days in some
cases. 300 But these states appear to be outliers. According to the same survey, 42
states limit emergency commitment without a hearing or neutral review to 72
hours or less.30 1 Of these, 19 states require a review within 24 hours.30 2
293. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
294. Id. at 425.
295. Id. at 430-31.
296. Id.
297. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2012).
298. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 963 n.4 (2d Cir. 1983). But see Howell v. Hodge, 710
E3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he bar for involuntarily removing someone from society against her
will is high-quite understandably and quite legitimately so."); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1090 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (finding that the "loss of basic civil rights" inherent in civil commitment impacts
constitutional interests "at least as high as those of persons accused of criminal offenses").
299. See 44 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 217 § 4.5 (1997); see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250
(West 2014) (seventy-two hours); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-47-207 (2009) (setting a seventy-two hour
window for a hearing); ALA. CODE § 22-52-2 (1991) (requiring immediate review by a probate judge of
an involuntary commitment petition); In re Young, 857 P2d 989, 1011-12 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)
(holding that, based on Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, "a 72-hour hearing is required by the constitu-
tional guaranty to due process," although the state statute at the time provided for a hearing after only
forty-five days); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 120-21 (Wis. 1995) (describing the seventy-two hour
hearing requirement in Wisconsin); 13B WASH. PRAC., CRIMINAL LAW § 2419 (2014-2015 ed.).
300. See generally Jon S. Vernick et al., Emergency Detention of Persons with Certain Mental
Disorders During Public Health Disasters: Legal and Policy Issues, 7 AM. J. DISASTER MED. 295,
297-300 (2012) (listing the permitted length of emergency mental health detention in all U.S. states and
the District of Columbia.).
301. Id.
302. Id.
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In an effort to take a modest approach to reforming immigration enforcement,
the prevailing seventy-two hour norm is striking because it is tailored to a civil
context. 30 3 Much like immigration detention, civil commitment is not intended
to be punitive. Although civil commitment law departs from criminal procedure
in certain details-for instance allowing seventy-two hours plus a weekend in
some cases, instead of forty-eight hours, as the admissible window before a
hearing-it also keeps to the basic framework established in Gerstein. In order
to constitutionally deprive someone of liberty for a prolonged period, there must
be a neutral review, it must be automatic, and it must come promptly within a
set period of days, not weeks.
CONCLUSION AND A SUGGESTION FOR A REMEDY
The means by which ICE takes people into custody on immigration grounds
is constitutionally problematic and increasingly under threat of judicial chal-
lenge. In 2014, federal courts across the country found that local and state
authorities violate the Fourth Amendment if they detain people on the basis of
requests from the existing DHS system. The looming question now is whether it
is similarly a Fourth Amendment problem for federal authorities to detain
people using this system.
Although DHS cancelled the Secure Communities program in November
2014, it has otherwise made only cosmetic changes to address the significant
constitutional concerns that have arisen in court. In 2015, DHS issued a revised
immigration detainer form, the 1-247D.3 °4 Much like the old system, the new
form requests law enforcement "maintain custody of [a person] for a period not
to exceed 48 hours beyond the time when he/she would otherwise have been
released., 30 5 Unlike the old version, the new form uses the phrase "probable
cause." 306 It states that "DHS has determined that... probable cause exists that
the subject is a removable alien., 30 7 It then provides four multiple-choice
options that can be checked to explain the basis for the purported probable
cause. 308 But there is no place on the form in which DHS would set out the
303. A similar norm appears in standards applicable to involuntary health quarantines. See Mark A.
Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the five day hearing requirement in the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act).
304. U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247D (2015). Sample on file with author. In early summer
2015, DHS circulated the revised form. In August 2015, I saw one of the revised detainer forms used in
reference to a criminal defendant in Las Vegas, NV, through my legal practice in the Thomas & Mack
Legal Clinic at UNLV. See generally Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, PEP v. Secure Communi-
ties, CRIMMIGRATION (July 7, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/07/07/pep-vs-secure-
communities (posting an electronic version of the new form, and describing its constitutional deficiencies).
305. U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 304.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. The four options are: (1) a final order of removal against the subject; (2) the pendency of
ongoing removal proceedings against the subject; (3) biometric confirmation of the subject's identity
and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to
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individualized details supporting its assertion.30 9 So, for instance, if DHS
asserts there is probable cause because of voluntary statements made by the
subject to an immigration officer, DHS need not specify what the actual
statements were, much less when, where or how they were elicited. Moreover,
the new detainer form, just like the old version, is to be signed only by an
Immigration Officer, not by any neutral magistrate or judge.310 Thus, DHS
appears intent on persisting with a system lacking neutral review and without
the requirement for a particularized, non-generic attestation of the basis for
probable cause. As a result of this reluctance to make anything other than
cosmetic reforms, the judiciary is likely to be asked to step in to scrutinize
whether this system meets the demands of the constitution.
Until now, the means by which federal authorities take immigrants into
custody have been insulated from constitutional scrutiny by the plenary power
doctrine and by the premise that immigration law is civil, not criminal. These
doctrines allowed the American immigration enforcement infrastructure to de-
velop in a parallel universe for more than a century. But rapid developments in
case law in the twenty-first century have significantly stripped away this
insulation. Plenary power no longer means that constitutional rights can be
ignored in the context of immigration. The civil-criminal distinction no longer
appears to determine the results of immigration cases with the Court increas-
ingly finding close connections between immigration and criminal law. Finally,
the procedures used to take immigrants into custody fall short of the safeguards
used in other civil contexts, such as involuntary commitment proceedings.
The challenge with this analysis is that it does not simply address relatively
exceptional cases, as the Court did in the Zadvydas decision on indefinite
detention. The Fourth Amendment problem with immigration arrests goes to the
heart of how immigration law is enforced routinely. This makes the fashioning
of a narrow remedy especially important. Following the Zadvydas path, the
remedy for this constitutional problem should be to interpret the statute so as to
avoid the problem. The means to do this would focus on the existing provisions
of the INA that provide that "on a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an
alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States. 3 11 Since the DHS reorganization, this has
been understood as a role assigned to ICE.312 But, as we have seen, the result of
other reliable information, that the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such
status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or (4) statements made voluntarily by the subject
to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the subject either
lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law. Id.
309. Even when courts allow for a relaxed standard of probable cause in immigration searches, they
have insisted on specificity and reliability in order to safeguard against unrestrained action by
immigration officials. See CESAR CUAUHTMOC GARCIA HERNANDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 96 (2015)
(describing varying approaches to defining probable cause in immigration searches).
310. Id.
311. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
312. See discussion supra Part IVA.
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this division of labor is that immigration arrest warrants are issued without the
involvement of any neutral adjudicator, with ambiguous standards, and without
an automatic timeline for the involvement of a neutral adjudicator. But the
existing statutes and regulations contain two other provisions relevant to this
process. First, ICE must issue a Notice to Appear charging an individual with
removability before issuing an arrest warrant.313 Second, the Attorney General,
or in practical terms, immigration judges and the BIA, retain jurisdiction over
removal adjudication and questions of law. 3 14
In order to avoid serious constitutional problems, these provisions should be
reinterpreted with three important changes.
First, immigration judges should issue immigration arrest warrants. This
would mean stripping this function from ICE, which is part of DHS, and
shifting it to the Department of Justice, which includes the immigration courts.
The immigration statute assigns to the Attorney General authority to make
rulings on questions of law. 3 15 Because warrants require a kind of adjudication,
as well as a question of law regarding the meaning of probable cause, these
tasks should be understood as remaining with the Attorney General. If issuing
warrants remains an ICE function, then the necessary ingredient of neutrality
will be missing and a serious constitutional problem would result.
Second, the INA, or at least the applicable regulations, should be amended so
as to state clearly that the standard for valid immigration arrests is probable
cause. 316 The applicable arrest warrant forms should be amended as well. As we
have seen, the probable cause standard has been clear in appellate case law
since the D.C. Circuit's decision in Au Yi Lau in 1971.317 But alternative
standards persist in the statute and the regulations, leading to ambiguity in
implementation. 318 Although an initial arrest may be justified by probable cause
that the person is in the United States unlawfully, continued custody should
require an additional showing of probable cause that she is subject to detention
under the immigration statute.
Third, if a person is to be held in immigration custody for seventy-two hours
after arrest, an immigration judge must review the case to ensure the existence
of probable cause. This timeline is consistent with the existing requirement that
an NTA initiating removal proceedings in immigration court must issue before
the arrest warrant.319 What would be new is that an immigration judge would
need to review the evidence on which ICE wishes to justify an arrest. With
313. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
314. See discussion supra Part IVA.
315. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
316. For a more demanding proposal, see Chelgren, supra note 16, at 1523 (arguing that under
Salerno there should be an adversarial hearing in which the government must prove dangerousness by
clear and convincing evidence before mandatory detention may be imposed).
317. See Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 E2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
318. Id.
319. See discussion supra Part IVA.
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warrantless arrests, an automatic, early review by an immigration judge is
necessary if the person is to remain detained pending resolution of the removal
case. The Supreme Court has held that, for warrantless arrests, the mere filing of
charges is not sufficient to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement for a
neutral determination of probable cause "as a prerequisite to extended restraint
of liberty following arrest.",320 Alternatively, ICE could opt to release the person
pending resolution of the removal proceedings in the normal course.
Two aspects of this proposal stop somewhat short of the requirements of
criminal procedure. First, the seventy-two hour requirement is borrowed from
the established standard used by states in other areas of civil confinement, such
as involuntary commitment on mental health grounds. It is longer than the
forty-eight hour clock used in criminal arrests. Second, the reliance on immigra-
tion judges would not create a mechanism for a "judicial determination of
probable cause," as called for in Gerstein.3 21 Immigration judges are administra-
tive adjudicators and part of the Executive Branch. However, the essential logic
in Gerstein is that the probable cause review needs to be conducted by an
adjudicator who is "neutral and detached," and immigration judges could
provide a significant measure of detachment from the ICE officers who arrest
people for immigration violations.3 22 My argument would be that the depriva-
tion of liberty inherent in immigration arrests and detention requires safeguards
that are closely analogous to those used in criminal investigations, but the
Supreme Court has also been clear that applications of the probable cause
standard may be tailored to specific administrative contexts.32 3
These interpretive reforms could be imposed by a federal court in the manner
used by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas. Alternatively, the Attorney General
could revise the regulations governing immigration arrests. 32 Whether by
decision of the Attorney General or a court, this approach would have the virtue
of repairing a constitutional vulnerability using features of the existing statute
and regulations. It would not require a court to strike down the immigration
arrest and custody system as unconstitutional, which would create an enforce-
ment vacuum until Congress managed to draft a new statute. In practice, this
interpretive approach would force changes in how ICE operates, in that ICE
officers would have to justify their arrests to immigration judges before their
execution or immediately thereafter. It would undoubtedly impose a new burden
on immigration judges, who are already backlogged and underresourced.32 5
320. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
321. Id.
322. See id. at 112-13 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
323. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1978); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 538-39 (1967).
324. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2012) (permitting the Attorney General to establish regulations and
administrative mechanisms as necessary to carry out the function of the Executive Office of Immigra-
tion Review).
325. There were more than 85,000 pending cases in immigration courts nationally as of December
2014. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/
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Concerns already exist that immigration judges are not adequately equipped to
supervise arrest procedures.3 26 There would be an urgent need for Congress to
add resources to immigration courts through the appropriations process. But
despite these drawbacks, this proposal would resolve the looming constitutional
problem within the current statutory framework. Congress would not need to
attempt to reform the INA itself. And in the present stalemate over immigration,
the ability to repair a looming problem without major statutory changes is no
small accomplishment.
The fundamental starting point to addressing immigration arrests is the
recognition that taking someone into custody on immigration grounds entails a
substantial infringement of liberty, much like a criminal arrest. There is a
compelling argument under procedural due process that there must be substan-
tial procedural protections in place. 27 The Fourth Amendment offers the most
applicable guidepost to the types of safeguards required while balancing the
exigent needs of law enforcement. In this light, it is helpful to recall Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Gerstein, joined by three other Justices, where he
lamented that the neutral probable cause review required after criminal arrests
was arguably less process than would be required in civil procedure for far
lesser infringements on individual rights. 328 The Fourth Amendment standard
here is actually quite modest given what is at stake. But it could nevertheless be
a radical shift for immigration enforcement.
court backlog (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). Nationally, these cases take 583 days to adjudicate on
average. Id.
326. See Chac6n, supra note 227, at 1565.
327. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that due process depends in part
on the private interests at stake in official action).
328. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I see no need in this case
for the Court to say that the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human
being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account, the custody of a
refrigerator, the temporary suspension of a public school student, or the suspension of a driver's
license." (internal citations omitted)).
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